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The role of U.S. Army Special Forces (SF) in the counterproliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD) has been minimal in recent years. As globalization leads to 
increased ability of both states and non-state actors to acquire WMDs, the efforts of 
Army SF should increase accordingly. Focusing on nuclear weapons, this thesis argues 
that Army SF elements are ideally positioned to contribute to the counterproliferation 
mission through the use of the global special operations forces (SOF) network. Utilizing 
the regional expertise of Army SF and its network of foreign military and government 
contacts achieved through years of sustained relationships, it serves as an ideal 
opportunity for strengthening counterproliferation capabilities across the world. Rather 
than focusing exclusively on the interdiction of WMDs by specialized SOF elements, this 
thesis recommends shifting to Phase Zero—before WMDs are present—with a focus on 
building partner capacity to combat WMDs. It examines the adaptation of existing Army 
SF programs and authorities in order to focus them on WMD and compares this to Army 
SF augmenting existing non-SOF counterproliferation programs. Finally, it explains how 
these missions can build relationships within the global SOF network for future 
operations against proliferators and lead to improved international security. 
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Since the United States tested its first nuclear weapon in 1945, many state and 
non-state actors throughout the world have attempted to produce or acquire their own 
nuclear weapons.1 The mere possession of a nuclear weapon represents power and 
prestige unlike that of any other military tool. Despite the low number of nuclear 
weapons detonated in combat, non-nuclear states and terrorists recognize their potential 
and clearly have a demand for and the potential to acquire fissile materials.2 To date, nine 
countries have succeeded in this endeavor, while at least one other country is suspected 
of attempting the feat.3 However, attempts are not limited to national programs. Former 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director George Tenet asserted that al-Qa’ida began a 
quest for nuclear weapons in the early 1990s.4 The Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo desired 
a capability so much that they purchased a ranch in Western Australia in order to mine 
uranium and even attempted to buy a nuclear warhead from Russia.5 Although state and 
non-state actors arrive at the decision to develop and use nuclear weapons for different 
motivations and through different methods, the devastating results of either require our 
attention. 
Recognizing the threat of not just nuclear weapons, but all weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD), the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) stated, “Preventing 
the proliferation and use of such weapons is therefore a top national priority for which 
                                                 
1 Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, 
and Chemical Threats, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), 
203. 
2 Moises Naim, “The Five Wars of Globalization,” Foreign Policy, no. 134 (January–February 2003): 
31, doi: 10.2307/3183519. 
3 Deadly Arsenals lists China, France, India, Israel, Pakistan, Russia, South Africa, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States as countries known to have produced weapons while North Korea is 
suspected of attempting to produce them. Cirincione, Wolfsthal and Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals, 45. 
4 George J. Tenet and Bill Harlow, At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA, 1st ed. (New 
York: Harper Collins, 2007), 261. 
5 David E. Kaplan and Andrew Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World: The Terrifying Story of the 
Aum Doomsday Cult, from the Subways of Tokyo to the Nuclear Arsenals of Russia, 1st American ed. (New 
York: Crown Publishers, 1996), 112, 127. 
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many federal agencies have important responsibilities.”6 This sentiment was echoed in 
the latest version of the QDR, which points to building partner capacity across the globe 
as vital to ensuring WMDs never reach U.S. territory.7 This thesis argues that the United 
States Army Special Forces could expand its participation in this effort in order to not 
only leverage existing relationships, but also to help synchronize broader security 
assistance programs in our partner nations. Although there is significant overlap in the CP 
efforts for chemical, biological, and radiological devices, this proposal focuses on the 
nuclear threat and the potential for its proliferation. A study by the RAND Corporation in 
2009 points out that since the United States lacks worldwide access and knowledge of 
proliferation routes and networks, building the capacity of our partners across the world 
is the only way to counter this threat.8 This assumes, however, that our partners share an 
appreciation of the threat from nuclear weapons and will therefore accept our efforts to 
build their capacity. Although we recognize the threat of proliferation, are the military 
and civilian agencies working in the most effective manner, synchronizing efforts and 
placing the appropriate subject matter experts in the correct locations to stop the spread of 
these weapons and their components? 
This problem is not merely one that can be solved by deploying U.S. government 
personnel worldwide, especially in an uncoordinated manner. Instead, we must consider 
the proliferation challenge from a whole-of-government approach and confront it as such. 
The aforementioned RAND study reaffirmed that, in addition to our military personnel, 
civilian agencies play a vital role in working through, by, and with security partners 
worldwide.9 Ensuring the appropriate subject matter experts gain access to the people and 
locations needed for mission success will require us to leverage available authorities and 
subordinate ourselves to the overall accomplishment of our goals, regardless of which 
organization claims bureaucratic turf or takes credit for success. Counterproliferation 
                                                 
6 United States Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington DC: 
Government Printing Office, 2010), 34. 
7 United States Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review 2014 (Washington DC: 
Government Printing Office, 2014), 13. 
8 Jennifer D. P. Moroney and Joe Hogler, Building Partner Capacity to Combat Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009), 1. 
9 Ibid., 4. 
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(CP) strategy must be tailored to fit the capabilities and needs of the specific locations 
and people where it is applied. It will require us to prioritize our efforts and conduct a 
thorough analysis to determine the appropriate ways and means to meet the desired ends 
within the theater campaign plans (TCP). Each situation must be unique and plans would 
be tailored to the specific circumstances facing partner nations. While some partners may 
require assistance with border control, other states may ask for nuclear facility security 
assistance or help with some other aspect of the overall CP mission. Allocating the 
appropriate resources to each situation will be essential to achieve success. For this 
reason, fully utilizing U.S. Army Special Forces’ global network of partners will allow us 
to increase the footprint of our defensive posture, provided our efforts are aligned in a 
synchronized, coordinated strategy. 
B. STATEMENT OF PROBLEM 
While the United States government employs numerous methods to prevent the 
proliferation of WMDs, the complex and fragmented nature of many of these operations 
promotes what are commonly referred to as “stovepipes of excellence.”10 The specialized 
agencies and units tasked to conduct a portion of the WMD mission are very capable 
within their scope, but they are often limited because of a lack of awareness or a 
reluctance to incorporate outside elements, both within the United States government and 
from our partner nations. The solution should connect the relevant organizations within 
the government, which represent a range of legal and jurisdictional authorities. A 2011 
product by Anya Loukianova of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies 
listed 181 U.S. government entities involved in nuclear policy making, with 50 of these 
in the Department of Defense alone.11 Rather than creating new programs or units, our 
efforts will be better spent crafting efficient utilization strategies, leveraging existing 
capabilities and partnering with appropriate subject matter experts throughout the 
                                                 
10 Charles Faint and Michael Harris, “F3EAD: Ops/Intel Fusion “Feeds” the SOF Targeting Process,” 
Small Wars Journal (2012, January), accessed February 11, 2014, 
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/f3ead-opsintel-fusion-%E2%80%9Cfeeds%E2%80%9D-the-sof-
targeting-process. 
11 Anya Loukianova, “Re-Charting U.S. Government Agencies Involved in Nuclear Policy,” 
December 1, 2011, http://cns.miis.edu/stories/pdfs/111111_chart_usg_wmd_anya_loukianova.pdf. 
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counterproliferation community in order to maximize the benefits of collaboration. The 
2009 RAND study recommended additional external coordination in order to discover 
additional potential collaboration efforts.12 As special operations forces (SOF) seek to 
further develop our relationships with partner nations, these collaboration efforts provide 
additional opportunities to maintain contact and expand our network. As Lieutenant 
Colonel (LTC) J. “Lumpy” Lumbaca argues in his article “Relationship Building: The 
Key Objective of U.S. SOF Phase Zero Engagement,” the relationships that SOF builds 
through frequent interactions with our partner nations allows us to maintain access and 
influence, leading to strategic success in addition to the tactical objectives.13 In 
describing its vision for the global SOF network of the future, the United States Special 
Operations Command (USSOCOM) points to building partner capacity through security 
force assistance as a way to strengthen our existing network and promote security.14 Our 
current engagement programs, such as the Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) 
program, provide sporadic exposure to our partner nations, requiring additional avenues 
for contact and influence.15 Army Special Forces’ (SF) augmentation of existing 
counterproliferation activities would therefore not only contribute to the individual 
program’s success, but also strengthen relationships and achieve our strategic goals. 
Since the goal of the TCPs is to maintain security and strengthen relationships within the 
respective regions, Army SF’s increased participation in the counterproliferation 
activities will lead to accomplishment of these broader objectives and make the best use 
of government resources. 
 
                                                 
12 Moroney and Hogler, Building Partner Capacity to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, 86. 
13 J. “Lumpy” Lumbaca, “Relationship Building: The Key Objective of U.S. SOF Phase Zero 
Engagement,” Special Warfare 27, no. 1 (2014): 29. 
14 United States Special Operations Command, Special Operations 2020: The Global SOF Network 
(Tampa, FL: United States Special Operations Command, 2013), 9. 
15 Brian S. Petit, Going Big by Getting Small (Denver, CO: Outskirts Press, 2013), 111. 
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C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research question this thesis asks is: How can U.S. Army Special 
Forces contribute to the reduction of proliferation of nuclear weapons through leveraging 
the global SOF network? While attempting to answer this question, several nested 
research questions arose: 
1. What advantages does this proposal provide over the existing units and 
efforts? 
2. What programs and missions of U.S. Army Special Forces align best with 
counterproliferation? 
3. What U.S. agencies and organizations could serve as the best partners and 
subject matter experts in the field of counterproliferation? 
4. What type of partner forces could benefit most based upon the perceived 
regional threat and existing capabilities? Would they be solely military 
units? 
5. What additional authorities could U.S. Army Special Forces leverage 
through partnerships in order to complete the mission? 
6. How does U.S. Army Special Forces’ participation in counterproliferation 
programs benefit the global SOF network and further develop our existing 
relationships? 
7. How do we educate our international partners in order to multiply our 
efforts and develop capabilities in their military and law enforcement 
elements? 
8. Although the thesis focuses on nuclear weapons, could these practices 
contribute to chemical, biological, and radiological CP efforts? 
D. HYPOTHESIS 
The stated hypothesis at the outset of this thesis was that the use of U.S. Army 
Special Forces in a joint, combined, and interagency approach to counter nuclear 
weapons proliferation will capitalize on existing relationships and lead to increased 
regional stability through foreign internal defense efforts. The intent of this use of Army 
SF is not to replace existing expertise, but rather to apply unique attributes and 
capabilities of Army SF to contribute to the completion of the mission. Rather than 
attempting to create an additional unilateral interdiction capability, this thesis will show 
that Army SF’s participation in a joint, combined, and interagency approach to 
counterproliferation can contribute significantly to the Phase Zero operations in support 
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of the theater campaign plans.16 Through the careful analysis of applicable missions and 
partner selection (both domestic and international), Army SF can integrate to the existing 
mission and provide a force-multiplying capability missing in the current structure. 
Similar to DOD’s administration of Department of State’s Title 22 Security Cooperation 
efforts, augmentation of non-DOD programs can achieve common security objectives.17 
E. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature related to this thesis typically falls into three distinct categories: 
international relations theory, counterproliferation, and U.S. government and Department 
of Defense publications and policies regarding authorities and responsibilities. 
1. International Relations Theory 
In a report for the RAND Corporation, John Arquilla and Paul Davis analyzed the 
“demand” side of the proliferation equation vice the “supply” side and noted that, 
although not the only factor, increased stability in a region decreased the desire of states 
to acquire WMDs.18 This is consistent with the mission of Army SF to conduct foreign 
internal defense (FID), which leads to increased stability in the region. Applying Arquilla 
and Davis’s analysis, we can see that through the conduct of foreign internal defense 
missions, Army SF is contributing to the reduction of proliferation of WMD. A more 
synchronized, focused FID approach aimed at improving border security and WMD 
detection capabilities would only further enhance this effect. 
An article in Foreign Policy by Gareth Evans describes cooperative security as 
the theory that explains the transition of collective security from deterrence as used by the 
United Nations in the mid- to late-1900s to that of a preventive role. He further describes 
                                                 
16 Throughout his book, COL Petit refers to “Phase Zero” operations aimed at preventing war, as 
opposed to the more common “Phase 0” operations, which alludes to follow-on phases of war. This is an 
appropriate term for this thesis, as successful counterproliferation efforts could eliminate the need for 
subsequent phases aimed at reducing nuclear threats. Petit, Going Big by Getting Small, 3. 
17 Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, Security Cooperation Programs Through 
Fiscal Year 2014. Revision 14.5 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2014), 25. 
http://www.disam.dsca.mil/documents/pubs/security_cooperation_programs_20140502.pdf 
18 John Arquilla and Paul Davis, Modeling Decisionmaking of Potential Proliferators as Part of 
Developing Counterproliferation Strategies (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1994), 37. 
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cooperative security as that of “prevention rather than correction” and promoting 
“interdependence rather than unilateralism.”19 In the case of WMDs, waiting until the 
“correction” phase and implementing our consequence management activities is too little, 
too late. Just as we have observed the integration of domestic law enforcement and 
intelligence capabilities since the 9/11 attacks, we should dedicate efforts to promoting 
interdependence among our domestic and international partners, with emphasis on 
counterproliferation. Similar to counter-insurgency operations, which the U.S. 
government is woefully aware of in the aftermath of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
this effort against proliferation will not be accomplished unilaterally. It will require 
reliance upon our allies across the world and should attempt to counter the threat as early 
in the weapons acquisition cycle as possible. 
In his book International Politics in the Atomic Age, John Herz describes 
collective security, in which nations undertake actions against a threat even if their nation 
is not directly at risk from the aggression.20 This theory is the backbone of programs such 
as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a cooperative, non-binding program in 
which states agree to assist based upon proximity of maritime vessels or flag-bearing 
status.21 Due to the international nature of proliferation and the cross-border operations 
prevalent in the illicit transfer of goods, this is a valid theory worthy of implementation. 
Especially noteworthy is the fact that the PSI is not a legally-binding membership, which 
could actually encourage more states to take part in operations.  
The Proliferation Puzzle: Why Nuclear Weapons Spread and What Results, edited 
by Zachary S. Davis and Benjamin Frankel, provides a detailed analysis of the decision 
making process through which states decide to acquire nuclear weapons.22 Written in 
1993, it looks at historical cases of nuclear weapons acquisition and attempts to link a 
                                                 
19 Gareth Evans, “Cooperative Security and Intrastate Conflict,” Foreign Policy, no. 96 (Autumn 
1994): 7. doi: 10.2307/1149213 
20 John H. Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1959), 84. 
21 U.S. Department of State, “Proliferation Security Initiative,” accessed January 30, 2014, 
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c10390.htm.  
22 Zachary S. Davis and Benjamin Frankel, eds., The Proliferation Puzzle: Why Nuclear Weapons 
Spread and what Results (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1993). 
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state’s decision to seek a device to international relations theory. This book departs from 
traditional arguments that focus solely on the states that chose to develop the capability 
and instead broadens the scope to include those states that have decided not to develop 
the capability.23 As such, this implies that rather than being a regional problem, it 
actually points to a global threat. In his chapter, “The Brooding Shadow: Systemic 
Incentives and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation,” Benjamin Frankel notes that a state’s 
decision is based upon “its perception of the security equation.”24 From this statement, it 
stands to reason that by increasing a state’s confidence in not only its own security, but 
also the commitment of the United States and its allies, we can reduce the number of 
states wishing to acquire a nuclear capability. 
2. Counterproliferation 
In his conclusion to Globalization and WMD Proliferation, James J. Wirtz posits 
that the Proliferation Security Initiative could be expanded outside the realm of maritime 
operations.25 This is an excellent point that seeks to leverage the success of this program 
and apply the methodology to land and air transportation networks. Much of the success, 
however, is due to the skillful integration of intelligence and interdiction activities. 
Expanding the program is not as simple as merely dedicating more interdiction assets or 
more money. Rather, this requires the participation of the intelligence and law 
enforcement entities of participating states, fully dedicated to the mission. Due to the 
interdependence of intelligence and interdiction efforts, states must dedicate adequate 
resources if they wish to counter the threat. More important, however, may be the fact 
that the PSI maritime operations utilize international waters and existing maritime laws. 
In an expansion to ground operations, any effort by a third party state’s ground forces to 
                                                 
23 Benjamin Frankel and Zachary S. Davis, “Nuclear Weapons Proliferation: Theory and Policy,” in 
The Proliferation Puzzle: Why Nuclear Weapons Spread and what Results, eds. Zachary S. Davis and 
Benjamin Frankel (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1993), 1. 
24 Benjamin Frankel, “The Brooding Shadow: Systemic Incentives and Nuclear Weapons 
Proliferation,” in The Proliferation Puzzle: Why Nuclear Weapons Spread and what Results, eds. Zachary 
S. Davis and Benjamin Frankel (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1993), 45. 
25 James J. Wirtz, “Conclusion,” in Globalization and WMD Proliferation: Terrorism, Transnational 
Networks, and International Security, eds. James A. Russell and James J. Wirtz (New York: Routledge, 
2008), 164. 
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interdict suspected proliferation activities would meet great scrutiny by the host nation. It 
is therefore of utmost importance that the state in which the activities occur have capable 
interdiction forces as well as a robust intelligence network tied to the international effort, 
not to mention an appreciation for the threat and a willingness to intervene. As David 
Albright and Corey Hinderstein argue in “The A. Q. Khan Illicit Nuclear Trade Network 
and Implications for Non-proliferation Efforts,” A. Q. Khan’s proliferation network 
intentionally sought WMD components from states that had little WMD expertise among 
export authorities, exploiting a capability gap.26 Relying upon these same states to detect 
and deter future proliferation without providing adequate resources and building their 
capabilities is a naïve proposition.  
Gordon Corera’s Shopping for Bombs describes A. Q. Khan’s international 
proliferation network and explains how Khan promoted the spread of nuclear technology 
throughout the world. His analysis not only shows how globalization and the ambiguity 
of dual-use components complicated the counterproliferation problem, but it also gives 
examples of the interplay of international relations and military objectives.27 In the case 
of A. Q. Khan’s network, he describes the hesitance of the U.S. government to interdict 
Dr. Khan due to the country’s relationship with Pakistan.28 The balance of maintaining 
relationships while accomplishing the mission is very important for the premise of this 
thesis. Since many of our potential partners (both domestic and international) have 
differing objectives and desired end states that may not coincide with those of Army SF, 
we must account for these differences when approaching selection of partners as well as 
determining the conduct of the mission. Like all interagency and international 
relationships, this must be a symbiotic relationship with both partners feeling satisfied. 
“Strategies for Combating Dark Networks,” a journal article written by Nancy 
Roberts and Sean Everton for the Journal of Social Structure, describes shortcomings of 
                                                 
26 David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, “The A. Q. Khan Illicit Nuclear Trade Network and 
Implications for Non-Proliferation Efforts,” in Globalization and WMD Proliferation: Terrorism, 
Transnational Networks, and International Security, eds. James A. Russell and James J. Wirtz (New York: 
Routledge, 2008), 60. 
27 Gordon Corera, Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise and 
Fall of the A. Q. Khan Network (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 28. 
28 Ibid., 40. 
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the current network analysis specific to counterterrorism efforts. Although terrorist 
networks and proliferation networks can differ significantly, this article makes valid 
points that can apply to both types. They discuss the categories of targeting a person, 
group, or organization, with different strategies attributed to each.29 This is important to 
note, as the partnerships and strategies recommended in this thesis must remain flexible 
and not be applied in a “cookie cutter” manner with little regard to the intended target. 
Rather, we should ensure we utilize the appropriate “approach” to building and 
implementing programs to combat the threat, as RAND analysts Jennifer Moroney and 
Joe Hogler suggest.30 Roberts and Everton also explain the differing costs, both monetary 
and effort-wise, to be considered when choosing strategic options. 31 Not all targets will 
require large sums of money or time. On the contrary, some network disruption efforts 
may be effective with smaller amounts of investment. What Roberts and Everton do not 
address to a large degree in this article, however, is the political costs of a strategic 
option. While they do mention the effects on the local populace of their approaches, they 
stop short of analyzing the long-term costs and benefits at the international level of 
analysis. This is a cost that must be carefully considered, as today’s activities can weigh 
heavily on future international relations, both for the positive and negative. 
3. U.S. Congress and Department Of Defense Publications and Policies 
Regarding Authorities and Responsibilities 
American leaders at all levels have publicly stated their dedication to the fight 
against weapons of mass destruction in recent years.32 While elements of the U.S. 
government define the various terms for combating WMD differently, the focus on 
prevention of the spread and use of the weapons remains the same throughout. Each of 
the guiding documents for our military’s operations correspondingly speaks to the 
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importance of the counter WMD mission. The National Security Strategy (NSS) of the 
United States of America sets the stage as it describes the limitation of nuclear 
proliferation as a top priority, covering a broad spectrum and focusing on not only 
denying terrorists access to existing stockpiles, but also preventing non-nuclear states 
from developing capabilities.33 While this document covers the entire CWMD spectrum, 
it pays particular attention to global cooperation in preventing the spread of nuclear 
weapons by focusing on securing nuclear material and technology.34 More specific to 
WMDs, the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction emphasizes the 
fact that proliferation is a global problem and threatens not only the United States, but 
many of our allies as well, requiring immense international cooperation towards this 
effort.35 
The National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction is 
intended to provide guidance and direction to Department of Defense (DOD) components 
in the counterproliferation realm.36 The backbone of the strategy relies upon six guiding 
principles, of which the most relevant to this thesis is that of “Assurance” which seeks the 
cooperation of our international partners to combat WMD proliferation together.37 It 
declares that one of the “ends” for combating WMD is ensuring that our allies and U.S. 
civilian agencies are partners in the effort as well.38 As the title implies, this strategy 
document focuses on the entire counter WMD spectrum, not merely the 
counterproliferation element. As such, it provides guidance for active missile and air 
defense systems and consequence management in addition to interdiction and building 
partner capabilities.39 Regarding the subject of building partner capabilities, it mentions 
the need to incorporate this strategy into each geographic combatant command’s theater 
                                                 
33 White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 23–24. 
34 Ibid., 24. 
35 White House, National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, 2002), 6. http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS24899. 
36 Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), 4. 
37 Ibid., 15. 
38 Ibid., 5. 
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campaign plan (TCP), which would include Joint Combined Exchange Training and 
Security Assistance programs, consistent with this thesis’ proposal.40 For examples of 
security cooperation programs, however, it cites only the Proliferation Security Initiative, 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and 
Nuclear (CBRN) battalion, and the NATO elimination efforts, which focus primarily on 
maritime interdiction, consequence management, and nuclear disarmament 
respectively.41 Lacking in this discussion is an effective Phase Zero counterproliferation 
effort aimed at reducing the flow across land borders or incorporation into existing 
international military exercises and interagency programs. This omission 
notwithstanding, the National Military Strategy provides a solid base from which 
subsequent, subordinate strategies focused on the subcomponents of the strategy can 
build. 
Joint Publication (JP) 3-40: Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction provides 
the Department of Defense’s joint doctrine for combating weapons of mass destruction. 
In doing so, it defines nonproliferation (NP) as “actions taken to prevent the proliferation 
of WMD by dissuading or impeding access to, or distribution of, sensitive technologies, 
material, and expertise.”42 Counterproliferation (CP), on the other hand, is defined as 
“actions taken to defeat the threat and/or use of WMD against the United States, our 
forces, allies, and partners.”43 Traditionally, nonproliferation activities are seen as the 
purview of the State Department, while the Department of Defense maintains a larger 
responsibility for counterproliferation activities. The methods suggested in this thesis 
include reliance upon security cooperation and military-to-military engagements, which 
are typically considered nonproliferation activities by JP 3-40,44 while the intended result 
of these methods is increased partner capacity to conduct WMD interdiction, elimination, 
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and WMD security cooperation, which are counterproliferation activities.45 Interestingly, 
the U.S. Army Field Manual 3-18: Special Forces Operations refers only to 
counterproliferation, which it labels as a core activity of Army Special Operations Forces 
and a principle task of Army SF.46 Unlike JP 3-40, it categorizes building partner 
capacity to combat WMD as a sub-task of the core activity of counterproliferation.47 In 
order to avoid using multiple terms for the activities, the remainder of this thesis will 
refer to building partner capacity to combat WMD as counterproliferation activities, in 
accordance with Army SF doctrine. As stated in the beginning of this section, the U.S. 
government’s various definitions of counterproliferation and nonproliferation may not 
match, but many elements of our efforts to curb the proliferation can alternate between 
the two missions.  Although these definitions may seem restrictive in nature, the truth is 
that our efforts all work to the same end. 
JP 3-40 also describes the “shaping” operations in Phase Zero, which serve to not 
only deter adversaries, but also to build and maintain relationships with our allies.48 This 
is congruent with international relations theories with regards to the effects of conducting 
foreign internal defense as a deterrence tool and it also speaks to the importance of those 
long-lasting relationships and the benefits to U.S. strategy. Illustrating the flexible nature 
of CWMD activities, the manual also depicts the possible integration of the activities 
across the range of military operations and as a component of the diplomatic, 
informational, military, and economic options.49 
Army Field Manual 3-18: Special Forces Operations (FM 3-18) provides 
guidance for all U.S. Army Special Forces operations. It provides the doctrinal 
framework through which all operations are planned and executed. Noteworthy for this 
thesis are the discussions of principle tasks and participation in multi-national exercises. 
Providing a definition of counter proliferation of WMDs, which it labels as a principle 
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task of Army Special Forces as mentioned in the previous paragraph, it also describes 
capabilities provided by Army Special Forces in this mission.50 Under the framework of 
foreign internal defense, this manual then describes Army Special Forces’ participation in 
joint and multinational exercises categorized as Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) 
Exercises or Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET), specifically authorized in 
Section 2011, Title 10, United States Code (10 USC 2011).51 An important benefit to the 
authorities granted under the JCET program that the manual points out is the access to 
countries around the world in which conventional forces do not operate.52 This access 
worldwide is a unique attribute to Army Special Forces and may be a key authority under 
which existing programs may gain access to additional areas of the world. Leveraging 
this authority and expanding the span of these programs will allow the appropriate 
subject matter experts to accomplish their respective missions more effectively.  
The annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) gives Department of 
Defense the authorities necessary to commit funds to programs and support of 
international partners. The NDAA for fiscal year 2005 gives two authorities relevant to 
this concept. The first is Section 1208: Support of Military Operations to Combat 
Terrorism. This section, which has been renewed as needed since 2005, provides support 
to individuals and groups supporting SOF efforts against terrorism.53 This funding may 
be applicable under certain circumstances, although it requires approval of the Secretary 
of Defense. A limitation is that the intent for this funding is not for foreign internal 
defense missions and other long-term relationships, so it would be beneficial only in 
limited circumstances, which is counter to the desire for building and maintaining long-
term relationships. The second section relevant to the concept is Section 1211: Defense 
International Counter Proliferation Programs. This section updates Section 1504(e)(3)(A) 
of the NDAA for fiscal year 1995, which allows the dedication of funds for specific 
counter proliferation activities and education for military personnel pertaining to counter 
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proliferation.54 This section authorizes funds for use in building partner-nation capability 
for countering proliferation of WMDs and may be useful as a method of obtaining funds 
for this concept. As mentioned previously, the solution may not require additional 
authorities granted to Army SF, but rather a coordinated patchwork of existing 
authorities. 
F. BACKGROUND 
Although Joint Publication 3-40 identifies key mission areas that cover the 
spectrum of counter WMD efforts, in practice, our efforts are much narrower and 
disjointed.55 Within SOF specifically, much of the traditional focus of 
counterproliferation of WMD is on the unilateral end-stage interdiction of weapons 
enroute to targets by select SOF elements, not by all forces. Although 
counterproliferation is a principal task of U.S. Army Special Forces, we fail to fully 
utilize our global special operations forces network to accomplish this mission through 
partner capacity building and instead focus primarily on unilateral interdiction efforts.56 
The majority of Operational Detachment-Alphas (ODA) receives little to no training on 
WMD. The U.S. Army Field Manual 3-05.20 notes that only ODAs “designated in 
national and theater contingency plans to participate in CP may be specially task-
organized, trained, and equipped” for this mission.57 Although the specially designated 
units are fully capable of executing the mission, the limited availability of these forces 
implies limited capacity and a lower likelihood that they will be in position to execute a 
counterproliferation mission. JP 3-40 provides examples of building partner capacity in 
order to support the WMD interdiction missions.58 
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Additionally, the end-stage interdiction of weapons is merely one portion of the 
CP mission, albeit the one with most tangible results. The global SOF network and our 
vast network of military and government allies are vital to the achievement of the 
detection of WMD programs, acquisition, and development. This suggests a shift to the 
Phase Zero component of contingency planning, which represents “setting the theater” 
and promoting the conditions for our international partners to augment our ongoing 
efforts.59 With this in mind, how do we leverage this existing network for optimal 
mission accomplishment? Is this a complementary solution to the existing efforts or 
merely a duplication of these efforts? 
As globalization makes international borders less relevant and illicit networks 
seek to exploit these security gaps, Army SF finds itself in a unique situation to assist in 
this effort. The problem is, however, that very few Army SF soldiers have experience 
with WMD, as noted above. This problem is therefore twofold. First, due to the finite 
amount of these specially designated ODAs, the likelihood that they will be in a position 
to either interdict a weapon or work with international partners to do so is 
correspondingly low. We must rely on the capabilities of our allies for this reason. 
Second, although they may be in a favorable location, if a non-CP designated ODA 
receives a mission related to WMD, the members have little experience specific to this 
mission and will be unable to operate at maximum capability. This leads us to a search 
for methods to not only increase Army SF capabilities, but also to leverage the global 
network of allies we have cultivated through many years of continued relationships. 
Addressing the problem of proliferation is a long-term process with limited short-
term tangible results. This thesis will discuss methods by which U.S. Army Special 
Forces can utilize existing authorities and partner with appropriate subject matter experts 
to counter the threat through an indirect approach. Through augmenting existing 
counterproliferation programs and activities, my hypothesis is that we can increase the 
level of proficiency of our international partners and expand their existing intelligence 
networks to detect and defeat both state actors as well as non-state actors with traditional 
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weapons or improvised “dirty” bombs. Concurrently, we will accomplish both SOF and 
other U.S. government objectives and build long-lasting relationships with our global 
SOF network. 
In addition to increasing the competency level in our partners, several other 
benefits arise through this proposal. Rather than only designated CP ODAs receiving any 
training on counter proliferation operations, these operations will allow the majority of 
ODAs (non-CP designees) to achieve a moderate level of competence in these skills 
through their interactions with the WMD subject matter experts during JCETs and JCS 
exercises. The result is a more versatile force capable of conducting a higher level of 
assistance to our partner nations. 
G. METHODOLOGY 
Due to the indirect method of conducting this mission and limited previous 
counterproliferation iterations, a methodology for effectively assessing the past success 
of this proposal is not readily available. Although past interagency efforts have achieved 
success, the integration of Army SF has not been applied in a coherent, long-term plan. 
Rather, a comparable program such as the cooperative counter narco-terrorism efforts 
with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) serves as a starting point for 
testing the hypothesis. This comparison, in conjunction with a brief analysis of other 
potential U.S. government partners and applications, will serve as a test of the hypothesis. 
Despite limited tangible results to prove the efficacy of this effort, the counter 
narcoterrorism (CNT) program improved host-nation capabilities as well as reducing the 
illicit drug trade that impacts national and international security. In testimony before the 
U.S. House of Representatives Domestic Policy Subcommittee of the Oversight and 
Government Reform Committee, Brookings Institution Fellow Vanda Felbab-Brown 
discussed the effects of supply-side policies on drug trafficking organizations and 
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attributes success to these programs.60 The increased security in the region reduces 
conflict and limits the power and influence of illicit networks. 
In addition to the non-SOF CP efforts, I will conduct an analysis of existing Army 
SF programs and missions as well as potential partners for future activities. Past JCETs 
and JCS exercises serve as historical references for the successful long-term partnerships 
Army SF has maintained with foreign military and governments throughout the world. 
Specially trained and regionally aligned, Army SF’s continued relationships with these 
partners have led to increased stability and cultivated strategic alliances in the process. 
In order to recommend potential partners for this program, the thesis will briefly 
analyze select military and interagency partners conducting counterproliferation activities 
to gauge suitability. The criteria for judging these partners include authorities and 
capabilities, regional alignment, and mission requirements. While not including an 
exhaustive list of potential partners and respective strengths, this will display the 
potential benefits that Army SF’s augmentation of these programs provides and serves as 
a starting point for future analysis. Recognizing that the region of the world selected for 
the mission could also affect partnerships, this will determine the suitability of Army 
SF’s integration. Additionally, the willingness and capability of our selected partner 
nations to participate in activities will vary greatly, dictating differing programs and types 
of activities. 
H. LIMITS OF RESEARCH AND ASSUMPTIONS 
Prior to this thesis research and throughout the process, I intentionally limited the 
scope of my research and made certain assumptions in order to focus my efforts. First, 
although the topic is combating WMD, I narrowed my topic to focus on the proliferation 
of nuclear weapons specifically. This is not related to any perceived notion of the threat 
levels associated with chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons, but rather it 
serves as a test subject for my research. An assumption of this thesis is that, although I 
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focus on nuclear weapons, the methods and activities suggested within could be tailored 
to the other types of WMD depending on the threat and the desires of the partner nations. 
A second assumption that I made was that, as DOD’s unconventional warfare and 
foreign internal defense specialists, Army SF is the appropriate military force to work 
through, by, and with our partner forces. This is not to say that U.S. Navy SEALs or 
Marine Special Operations Forces or even our Allied SOF could not accomplish the 
mission. On the contrary, partner nation situations may dictate that Army SF is not the 
appropriate force and that our fellow SOF could provide better training. It is also not 
limited to the typical 12-man Operational Detachment-Alpha through which Army SF 
typically operates. In order to maximize the potential for broad engagement, this concept 
is not limited to small teams. Again, this limitation to Army SF throughout the thesis was 
only done for simplicity’s sake. 
Third, my recommendation to focus on Phase Zero preventative measures says 
nothing of a lack of confidence in our specialized elements responsible for interdiction 
and consequence management activities. Instead, combating WMD is a multi-layered 
mission set, as recognized by JP 3-40.61 This method merely complements other efforts 
and provides a minimal amount of redundancy, which is a moderate overlap rather than 
unnecessary duplication of efforts. 
A final assumption I made during my research was to assume that the United 
States had already selected partner nations with a shared understanding of the 
proliferation threat. Although the partner nations need not share the same level of threat 
perception, they simply need to recognize the value that the United States places on the 
threat and be willing to assist in the achievement of the ends. Comprehensive studies 
already assess the viability of partner nations and include metrics for determining partner 
nation willingness to participate.62 For the purposes of this thesis, we will assume that we 
have moved beyond this initial phase of partner selection and are now looking for 
appropriate ways and means. 
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I. THESIS OUTLINE 
Chapter II of this thesis will discuss the problem of nuclear proliferation, giving a 
brief history of nuclear weapons as appropriate to this discussion as well as a condensed 
overview of historical programs and regulations aimed at preventing the proliferation of 
WMDs. Chapter III will first review the role of Army SF and discuss the unique 
attributes and capabilities of Army SF that makes it a potential force to augment existing 
programs. It will then examine existing programs and authorities frequently utilized by 
Army SF and discuss augmentation of these activities by WMD subject matter experts. 
Chapter IV will take an alternative approach and provide an analysis of a select group of 
existing programs outside of USSOCOM that could serve as potential partners for Army 
SF, leveraging the capabilities of Army SF and its global SOF network. Chapters III and 
IV provide distinct, although potentially complementary, approaches to this problem. 
Finally, Chapter V provides a conclusion of the thesis.  
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II. THE PROBLEM OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The fear of widespread use or possession of nuclear weapons is not a new 
phenomenon. In fact, President Harry Truman began suggesting control measures for the 
technology merely two months after the detonations in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.63 Eight 
years later, President Dwight Eisenhower announced the Atoms for Peace program, 
intended to limit the use of nuclear technology for the good of mankind, rather than 
solely for its use as a weapon.64 Sixty years later, despite additional legal restrictions, 
international efforts, and programs designed to curb proliferation of the technology and 
equipment, the threat of nuclear proliferation remains a problem. This is not to say we 
have made no progress but simply that the demand for nuclear weapons persists. This 
chapter will relate the problem of nuclear proliferation to our ongoing efforts and attempt 
to show areas for implementation of new strategies. To do so, it will begin with a brief 
history of nuclear weapons as it pertains to this thesis. While this is not intended to be a 
comprehensive history, it will examine the shift from large state-sponsored acquisition 
programs to that of rogue state actors and terrorist groups. Following this, we will look at 
the differences between the acquisition of WMDs by state and non-state actors. This 
chapter will conclude with a look at historical international efforts to stop the 
proliferation, with a limited amount of critique and praise for each program. 
B. A BRIEF HISTORY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
The early efforts of Robert Oppenheimer’s Manhattan Project paved the way for 
the creation of a weapon capable of unleashing the tremendous power of the atom. With 
the first atomic bomb’s production in the spring of 1945, followed by its detonation a few 
months later in New Mexico, the United States was prepared to employ the new device.65 
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At the same time, the United States was deeply involved in World War II, engaged in 
combat in two theaters and searching for a way to end the conflict. Recognizing the 
implications of a nuclear weapon on military strategy and the role of deterrence in the 
future, Yale University political scientist Bernard Brodie remarked, “Everything that I 
have written is obsolete.”66 Thus, began a long-standing debate about the value and 
necessity of nuclear weapons. 
As the United States’ chief competitor at the time, the Soviet Union worked 
feverishly and tested its first nuclear weapon on August 29, 1949, ensuring the that 
coming years of the Cold War would be fraught with fears of nuclear war. The potential 
of either country to retaliate in overwhelming fashion deterred both countries from 
launching a first strike during the Cold War. Although we could measure to some extent 
the Soviet capabilities at the time, their intentions were much more difficult to gauge.67 
Thus, it became less a matter of balancing the symmetry of total number of weapons and 
more a mental challenge of determining whether the opposition was willing to risk total 
destruction by launching an attack. Herman Kahn’s strategy for deterrence in the nuclear 
age called for us to “emphasize the impact of our capabilities on the enemy’s mind rather 
than on his body.”68 Soviet propaganda in the late 1950s sought to plant seeds of fear in 
the minds of the United States and its allies with regards to the Soviet willingness to 
retaliate.69 During the period where only the United States and the U.S.S.R. possessed 
nuclear weapons, this fear of nuclear war produced a surprisingly stable security 
environment, albeit a tense one. While some argue that neither the American nor the 
Soviet planners adhered to a mutually assured destruction (MAD) philosophy, the 
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uncertainty regarding the opposition’s true intentions likely contributed to a reluctance to 
resort to the use of nuclear weapons and direct attacks.70 
While many within the defense establishment saw the utility of nuclear weapons 
in future warfare, some that were heavily involved in the initial development began to 
have second thoughts about them. Both the Baruch plan and the Acheson-Lilienthal 
report of the mid-1940s recommended the proposed International Atomic Energy 
Authority maintain control of all dangerous nuclear activities, owing to their assessments 
that the widespread possession of nuclear weapons would increase not only the intensity, 
but also the probability of outbreak of war.71 Keenly aware of the potential for misuse of 
nuclear weapons, Robert Oppenheimer led efforts to “put the nuclear genie back into the 
bottle” and developed restrictions on future development of capabilities, eventually 
leading to Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace program.72 This program expanded in 1957 to 
include safeguards inspections conducted by what then became the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA), charged with promoting peaceful use of nuclear energy.73 By 
this time, however, the power and prestige associated with possessing a nuclear weapon 
outweighed the simply peaceful applications, enticing other countries to develop their 
own weapons. By the introduction of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 
1968, five countries were recognized as nuclear weapon states, while many additional 
countries have developed capabilities after the institution of the NPT.74 
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Two of the countries that did not sign the NPT, yet developed weapons 
subsequent to 1968, did so as the result of an arms race situation. Following its crushing 
defeat by India in 1971, Pakistan began efforts to develop a nuclear weapon, which only 
accelerated following India’s nuclear test in 1974.75 Chief among those involved in the 
development for Pakistan was Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, a metallurgist working in the 
Netherlands who offered his services on behalf of his beloved country as the head of 
Khan Research Laboratories.76 Khan’s rise to power among the Pakistani elite played an 
important role in the worldwide proliferation of nuclear technology. Leveraging his 
contacts across the globe, he developed a supply network capable of circumventing 
export controls and buying individual components that were more difficult to trace than 
entire systems.77 If A. Q. Khan had stopped after Pakistan procured enough technology to 
develop its own weapon, we might face a different world than we do today. Instead, he 
used his network to proliferate nuclear weapons technology and knowledge to any 
country willing to pay. A. Q. Khan is credited with providing this technology to Iran, 
North Korea, and Libya, advancing the nuclear programs of each country substantially.78 
As reported by several sources, retired Pakistani scientists also met with Al Qaeda leaders 
in Afghanistan in 2001, showing that these proliferators were willing to provide 
assistance to both state and non-state actors alike.79 Although the Pakistani government 
placed Khan under house arrest in February 2004, his past proliferation activities cannot 
be undone. As a result of networks like Khan’s, the United Nations Security Council 
passed Resolution 1540 (UNSCR 1540) in 2004, which specifically prohibits states from 
providing any support to non-state actors in their quest to procure WMDs, as well as  
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directing them to adopt and enforce appropriate counterproliferation laws.80 Due to the 
inclusion of all types of WMD in this resolution, it supports not only the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT), but also the Chemical Weapons Convention and the 
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. 
The history of nuclear weapons shows that what was once the domain of the 
world’s superpowers in a bilateral standoff has now become a widespread problem. As 
the number of nuclear capable countries increases, the potential for a nuclear disaster 
increases as well. Whether it is an accidental deployment or a terrorist group’s acquisition 
of a weapon, the results are the same. In an increasingly connected world, the ease of data 
transfer only serves to compound the issue. As Gordon Corera points out in Shopping for 
Bombs, A. Q. Khan’s distribution of knowledge about nuclear weapons design is possibly 
more worrisome than the physical components he provided.81 Thanks to the same 
technology our legitimate business world relies upon to connect us, the illegitimate actors 
of the world can connect with the same ease. Many of our existing counterproliferation 
efforts are designed to counter the threats posed by networks like that of A. Q. Khan. 
C. TYPES OF THREATS 
Actors wishing to acquire nuclear weapons typically fall under two broad 
categories: state and non-state actors. Although similarities exist between them, we must 
consider differing motivations, likely uses of WMD, and methods of deterrence when 
crafting our national combating WMD (CWMD) strategies. Common between the groups 
is the weapon itself. While the size of the weapon (intercontinental ballistic missile 
versus tactical suitcase nuclear device, for example) that each group desires differs, the 
facilities and knowledge required for each is similar. Our efforts aimed at countering their 
development and use of the weapons will have some overlap as well as some significant 
distinctions. 
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From the perspective of the state actor, one must consider the barriers to 
producing a nuclear weapon today. Aside from the necessary technology and scientific 
knowledge required, legal restrictions such as UNSCR 1540 and a vast network of 
national and international export laws severely limit the ability of states to import the 
necessary components.82 This does not necessarily imply that it is impossible, as A. Q. 
Khan proved, but nevertheless it takes a dedicated network of suppliers with extensive 
knowledge of the gaps in export controls and identified suppliers of the various 
components. We must also understand the motivation behind a state’s development 
program. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, for example, was given further motivation 
and attention following the country’s crushing defeat by India in 1971, combined with 
India’s subsequent successful nuclear test in 1974 leading to a perception of asymmetry 
from the Pakistani view.83 An arms race between two states is not the only motivation, 
however. Rather, it could be a feeling of political isolation, as David Albright argues was 
the case for South Africa’s now defunct program.84 As such, the likelihood of a state 
actor obtaining a weapon is dependent upon the state’s capabilities as well as their intent, 
which can be difficult to properly estimate. 
Non-state actors, in general, have a much different motivation as well as 
procurement strategy. Traditionally lacking a safe haven in which to produce their own 
weapons, they will be more likely to acquire a weapon or components that have already 
been produced. Without overlooking the possibility of a group building a gun-type 
weapon with stolen nuclear materials, this typically points to two options for acquiring a 
pre-built weapon: stealing an existing weapon or receiving a weapon from a sympathetic 
nuclear-capable state. While not necessarily impossible, the likelihood of either of these 
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latter scenarios is quite low due to a myriad of factors.85 Regarding the motivation for 
acquiring a weapon, a non-state actor’s reasons could be as varied as the groups 
themselves. Aum Shinrikyo desired a nuclear weapon in order to “trigger the 
apocalypse,”86 while Al Qaeda desired one out of religious duty to protect fellow 
Muslims.87 In these cases, traditional deterrence theories prove much more difficult to 
enact and our efforts may be better spent on the supply side by preventing the 
proliferation versus the demand side. This not only refers to security of nuclear materials, 
but it also includes the intelligence network required to detect and defeat proliferators. If 
a non-state actor seeks to assemble a traditional nuclear weapon or even construct a 
nuclear “dirty bomb”, we must be able to rely upon the integration of intelligence and 
interdiction capabilities worldwide in order to prevent catastrophe. 
While we cannot assume that a common strategy will prevent both state and non-
state actors from constructing or employing a nuclear weapon, the overlaps between the 
two suggest that both would benefit from an overarching CWMD strategy. While state 
actors may be more effectively deterred through the traditional DIMEFIL (diplomatic, 
information, military, economic, finance, intelligence, and law enforcement) model of 
elements of national power, we can still employ elements of it to prevent proliferation by 
non-state actors.88 The variety of threats against our national interests suggests that we 
should rely upon an interwoven, layered approach rather than relying upon interdiction or 
deterrence alone, regardless of the type of threat. 
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D. PAST INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS 
In the years since the development of the nuclear weapon, efforts to curb its 
proliferation have evolved. Initially focused on developing treaties, such as the NPT and 
adherence to IAEA standards, the programs have become more active in countering the 
smuggling and development of technology. This could be a result of laws such as 
UNSCR 1540, or it could be due to the realization that globalization has interconnected 
countries across the world and that collective security is an increasingly important 
component of our overall approach. 
While the NPT did not succeed in completely preventing the proliferation of 
WMDs, it serves as the basis for many of our existing programs. At its core, the NPT 
called for nuclear states to not proliferate WMD technology to non-nuclear states and 
prevented non-nuclear states from developing the capability.89 In return, the signatory 
countries would have access to peaceful atomic energy technology.90 However, what it 
lacked was a preventative measure for signatories to withdraw from the NPT upon receipt 
of the peaceful technology as well as an obligation for any state to become a signatory in 
the first place. Exploiting this lack of enforceability in 1974, non-NPT member India 
conducted an underground explosion of a 12-kiloton plutonium bomb, arguing that it was 
not compelled to adhere to NPT standards.91 North Korea, on the other hand, signed the 
NPT in 1985 yet chose to withdraw 15 years later, amid continued denials of entry for 
international inspectors.92 
The nuclear weapon states were also not immune to criticism of their apparent 
lack of adherence to NPT agreements. In 1990, 22 years after the initial signatures to the 
NPT, many raised the longstanding concern that the nuclear weapon states had not 
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sufficiently decreased their nuclear arsenals, in accordance with the NPT.93 This led to 
the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) between the United States and the Soviet 
Union in 1991, in which they agreed to more stringent disarmament timelines and 
quantities.94 
While much of the initial emphasis on nuclear weapons controls focused on state 
actors, the past 12 years have shown expanded focus on terrorist and non-state actors. 
Although it has received less attention due to the unlikely possibility of use for a terrorist 
attack, the potential exists. Testimony from former bin Laden associate Jamal Ahmad al-
Fadl and other analysis points out a trend of attempts by terrorist organizations to acquire 
WMDs.95 Since they have shown the intent, we must limit the ability of these 
organizations to acquire devices. 
As mentioned previously, the threat of non-state actors acquiring nuclear devices 
led the United Nations Security Council to adopt UNSCR 1540 in 2004. This resolution 
obligates states to enact legislature and regulations to prevent the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction.96 While it also limits the ability of state actors from 
importing and exporting nuclear technology, its primary aim was to focus attention on the 
non-state actor and terrorist networks following the revelation of the A. Q. Khan 
proliferation network.97 Although export controls existed prior to this resolution, the 
added emphasis and backing of the United Nations provided additional strength to the 
controls. In his book Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb, Brigadier 
(retired) Feroz Hassan Khan notes that Pakistan was especially adept at circumventing 
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existing export controls, adopting tactics such as buying smaller components versus 
entire units and masking the intended destination and purpose of the components.98 
As the United States and its allies recognized that unilateral efforts have limited 
value in the global fight against nuclear proliferation, they created several programs 
aimed at multinational participation in recent years. Two of these programs are the 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) 
Program. While the CTR focuses on the supply side of the equation, limiting the 
available means for production, the PSI is a cooperative interdiction program. 
The Proliferation Security Initiative seeks to eliminate the transfer of WMD, 
delivery systems, and related parts through the cooperative efforts of participating states. 
Now claiming more than 100 member nations, this program began in 2003 and uses a 
simple document known as the “Statement of Interdiction Principles” to describe how the 
program utilizes existing legal authorities to target “states and non-state actors of 
proliferation concern.”99 Traditionally, the PSI has focused solely on maritime targets, 
likely due to the ease of incorporating existing international maritime laws and avoiding 
sovereign territory disputes. Smugglers are smart, however, and as Andrew C. Winner 
points out, the focus on interdiction at sea will simply result in the increased use of 
aircraft as well as overland trafficking across borders to avoid the authorities.100 While 
the expansion of PSI to incorporate ground and air interdiction seems to be a potential for 
future efforts, this may require a review of the existing “Statement of Interdiction 
Principles.” 
Complementary to the PSI is the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR), 
which seeks to reduce the threat posed by the proliferation of WMD materials from the 
former Soviet Union.101 This program incorporates strategies to defeat the proliferation 
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of not only nuclear, but also chemical and biological materials and expertise. According 
to the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), the CTR program has “deactivated 
more than 7,500 nuclear warheads,” making them unusable by potential proliferators.102 
Reducing the supply of existing nuclear weapons infers that interested states and non-
state actors will be limited to producing their own weapons. As Joseph A. Benkert, 
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs, reported to 
the U.S. Senate’s Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, the CTR has been 
“increasing foreign institutional capacity to address WMD threats,” rather than relying 
solely upon U.S. efforts.103 Additionally, the CTR has evolved through the years and now 
includes programs outside the former Soviet Union. The CTR was instrumental in 
reducing the risk of chemical weapons in both Syria and Libya recently.104 Chapter IV 
discusses this evolution of the CTR in more detail. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Through the years, the world has shifted from many supporting the procurement 
of nuclear weapons to not only questioning their value, but also suggesting we should 
eliminate them altogether. Few military weapons throughout history have evoked such a 
public outcry as nuclear weapons have. Unfortunately, although the general consensus 
may be that we should rid the world of nuclear weapons, followers of the realist theory 
would argue that nations or groups should still attempt to maintain this awesome power, 
serving as a deterrent to provocation by others. While our national strategy has 
acknowledged this fact, our CWMD efforts have been limited in scope. Our existing 
CWMD programs and missions have focused on a narrow set of capabilities, without 
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leveraging all of our available assets. Programs such as PSI and CTR, while effective, fail 
to leverage foreign military and law enforcement ground forces to a sufficient degree, and 
rely instead upon maritime interdiction assets and nuclear subject matter experts, 
therefore attacking only one aspect of the problem. In the future, we must recognize these 
limitations and adjust our programs accordingly in order to deter both state and non-state 
actors alike.  
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III. ARMY SF’S ROLE AND EXISTING PROGRAMS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Recognizing that we face a unique threat in the form of nuclear weapons 
proliferation, the task now becomes selecting the forces best suited for countering the 
threat. While the United States could simply rely upon vast amounts of money and 
technology and choose to focus on unilateral interdiction operations, this option faces 
drawbacks. Not only does it assume that the United States will have the access and 
placement it requires to develop intelligence and detect proliferation attempts, but it also 
unintentionally reduces the margin of error. If we wait until a nuclear weapon is 
assembled and en route to its intended target, we face the possibility of catastrophe if we 
somehow miss an opportunity to intervene. The earlier in the weapon acquisition process 
we can take action, the less chance of error. The problem with this situation, however, is 
now we are searching for thousands of components for a nuclear device, many of which 
are dual-use items capable of peaceful applications as well. Considering the sourcing of 
these materials is worldwide, we must correspondingly increase our global footprint 
beyond the capacity of our designated counterproliferation forces. The ideal strategy is 
therefore to work through, by, and with partner nation forces to prevent this proliferation.  
This chapter argues that the United States Army Special Forces should expand its 
role in this Phase Zero approach to countering proliferation, through partnership with not 
only partner nation elements, but other U.S. government agencies and programs as well. 
In doing so, the chapter will first discuss the unique capabilities that set Army SF apart 
from other Department of Defense elements, both in terms of skills and authorities as 
well as integration within the respective geographic combat commander’s (GCC) theater 
campaign plans. This is not meant to appear as a sales pitch for Army SF, but rather a 
potential application of military forces that complements our instruments of national 
power. Next, it will analyze the two main programs through which Army SF conduct 
engagements with partner nation forces. The analysis of positive and negative aspects of 
these will show that a combination of programs is needed to meet our 
counterproliferation goals. 
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B. ARMY SPECIAL FORCES AS THE IDEAL CP FORCE 
Within the U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF), the Army Special Forces are 
unique in their ability to work through, by, and with foreign forces. Trained in foreign 
languages, cultural awareness, and experts in small unit tactics, they are ideally suited to 
partner with host nation forces to conduct foreign internal defense (FID) missions. 
Keenly aware of the power of partner forces as force multipliers, building partner 
capacity through persistent engagements is a primary goal of Army SF. Army Field 
Manual 3-18: Special Forces Operations notes that these engagements produce not only 
influence in the partner nations, but also help to prevent and deter unwanted enemy 
activities.105 As a result, these activities attempt to dissuade adversaries from acting in 
the first place, but should they attempt to proliferate WMDs, our contacts in the country 
will be capable of intervening. Even if the partner nation is unwilling to conduct the 
interdiction themselves, our relationship may compel them to ask for assistance from the 
United States or its allies. 
Although Army SF’s persistent engagements have always contributed to 
increased security through building partner capacity for securing borders and other areas, 
the counterproliferation mission had not been elevated in status until the past 10 years. As 
recently as 2002, counterproliferation was not even listed as a mission of Army SF.106 
With the recognition that the threat of WMDs has increased, so too has our focus on the 
mission increased. Currently, counterproliferation is a core activity of Army SOF and a 
principle task of Army SF.107 The question is: should we focus specifically on the 
counterproliferation threat or instead focus on an overall security goal? As an 
experienced Army Special Operations planner, Lieutenant Colonel Mike Kenny posits 
that we should focus on the latter, “establishing networks and infrastructure that serve 
multiple purposes,” while specialized capabilities can be incorporated as needed to 
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counter specific threats.108 While this is a valid approach that will maximize versatility 
and make good use of our finite troops and resources, for the sake of analysis, the 
following section will approach the problem from the alternative method, focusing on the 
threat itself. 
C. JOINT COMBINED EXCHANGE TRAINING 
The use of Army SF in security assistance missions is directed by the GCC’s 
theater campaign plans. Typically conducted through Joint Combined Exchange Training 
events, the aim of these events is to train U.S. SOF in order to develop and maintain vital 
skills. As the predominant form of partner engagement by Army SF, over 50 percent of 
our efforts to build partner capacity take the form of JCETs.109 Arguably, host nation 
forces also reap benefits from these events, but this is not the primary focus. As such, if 
we are to focus on building partner capacity to counter proliferation activities, JCET may 
not be the appropriate program. While it does provide DOD funding in accordance with 
10 U.S.C. 2011, the restrictions placed upon the training and the lack of persistent 
engagement limit its value.110 In Going Big by Getting Small, Colonel Brian S. Petit 
explains that JCETs do have an effect on building relationships and improving host 
nation capabilities, but successful execution requires careful integration into the broader 
strategy with an eye to choosing the right partners.111 They must be coordinated within 
the theater campaign plans as well as meet the needs of the host nation partner. 
The major advantages of JCETs are the flexibility of the program and the overt 
SOF presence in a partner country. Due to the broad range of skills that Army SF must 
maintain, the authorities of a JCET allow the unit to tailor the JCET’s mission in order to 
meet those needs. In other words, the intent of a JCET can be easily shaped in order to 
focus on the desired mission set, such as counterproliferation or border security 
operations. While this still requires the host nation to agree upon this proposed intent for 
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a JCET, the framework supports it. The host nation may request to focus on a particular 
sub-set of counterproliferation skills, such as interdiction activities, but this can be 
coordinated and de-conflicted well in advance of the event. From a deterrence standpoint, 
the overt presence of special operations personnel in a partner nation provides irrefutable 
evidence of not only our nation’s concern for security in the region, but also our desire to 
build a stronger relationship with that country. 
While JCETs provide many advantages for the counterproliferation mission, they 
also possess inherent drawbacks. Ideally, a counterproliferation-focused JCET could 
incorporate subject matter experts from the Department of Energy, the Defense Threat 
Reduction Agency, or elsewhere in the WMD field in order to draw upon this expertise 
and build partner capacity. Unfortunately, 10 U.S.C. 2011 states that the funding and 
authorities only apply to special operations forces assigned to USSOCOM.112 As most of 
these WMD subject matter experts are not subordinate to USSOCOM, this precludes 
their participation. In addition to this limitation, the short duration of JCETs limits the 
ability of SOF to cultivate long-term relationships with its counterparts. Although this 
appears to be a great limitation on the surface, if our intent is to increase the quantity of 
relationships across the world versus the quality of those relationships, this limitation is 
less important. From this viewpoint, multiple short-duration JCETs that expose our forces 
to greater numbers of partner nation forces actually increases the footprint of our global 
SOF network. Although these relationships may not be as strong as those resulting from 
longer contact periods, they at least introduce our forces to the world on a greater scale. 
An often overlooked method is the use of Army National Guard Special Forces 
units for theater cooperation plan events. In response to critiques of the short-duration of 
JCETs, some suggest that the use of Army National Guard Special Forces elements is an 
ideal method to acquire longer contact periods through “super-JCETs” lasting up to 60 
                                                 




days.113 Additionally, the National Guard’s State Sponsorship Program, which affiliates 
units with a specified partner nation’s military, might offer better chances to cultivate 
long-term relationships.114 While these activities do not eliminate the perceived lack of 
consistent engagement and short-duration focus, they at least serve to mitigate the effects 
and can be aligned with the overall strategy. 
D. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF EXERCISES 
Conducted on a larger scale than JCETs, exercises sponsored by the Joint Staff 
(commonly known as JCS exercises) provide additional opportunities for engagement. 
Receiving authority from Title 10 U.S.C. 153, they are periodic events “to promote 
interoperability, evaluate readiness, and promote influence.”115 The annual Key Resolve 
exercise executed by U.S. Forces Korea and Republic of Korea forces and the Flintlock 
exercise executed by African, Western, and U.S. forces are examples of exercises 
designed to not only improve interoperability but to provide a display of U.S. 
commitment to the security of a region.116 Unlike JCETs, the large scale of these 
operations typically requires them to be much less frequent (often once per year) and also 
limits the ability of the participating units to determine the scope of the training. As these 
are more often high-visibility events, the tendency is to incorporate operations that 
provide tangible results. Because of this, less attention is paid to the relationships and 
capabilities built, with more focus on the accomplishment of a desired end state, such as 
the interdiction of a WMD device or capture of a high-value target. However, Army SF 
often executes a JCET prior to a JCS exercise in order to promote interoperability during 
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the exercise, which only serves to strengthen the relationship and improve capabilities. In 
summary, JCS exercises can be a valuable tool through which we can build partner 
capacity, provided it is nested within the overall strategy and complemented by other 
programs and events. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Although we have been able to make the authorities work to meet our needs in 
recent years, the programs and authorities granted to Army SF currently are not optimal 
for use in a counterproliferation mission. While JCETs are great for ensuring our Army 
SF maintain necessary skills during peacetime, they are less ideal for building partner 
capacity due to their focus on U.S. requirements and episodic nature. This suggests that 
JCETs have been stretched beyond their original intent and we must look to other 
programs and authorities to meet our building partner capacity (BPC) needs, especially 
against the counterproliferation threat. With this in mind, however, the benefits of CP-
focused JCETs will still contribute to the overall CP mission, with the understanding that 
they are not the sole solution to the problem. 
Complementary to JCETs, but not without limitations themselves, JCS exercises 
provide avenues to build relationships and partner capacity. These provide a global 
platform to show U.S. concern and desire for interoperability as well. Their infrequent 
use and lack of flexibility, however, limit their usefulness as the sole program in the fight 
against proliferation of WMDs. As such, a combination of JCETs, JCS exercises, and 
participation in other programs may be required to meet the needs of the theater 
campaign plans. This combination will expose our forces to the greatest number of 
partner nation forces and it leverages various authorities and funding. Although this 
complicates the planning process and we must ensure alignment with the theater 
cooperation plans, the hybrid solution may provide the best way to accomplish our goals. 
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IV. POTENTIAL PARTNERS AND PROGRAMS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Many agencies and departments within the U.S. government currently participate 
in programs aimed at preventing the proliferation of WMD. As depicted in the work of 
Anya Loukianova for the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, at least 181 
entities focus efforts on nuclear proliferation alone.117 While the ways and means of 
these programs vary significantly, the desired ends of many programs align well with 
U.S. SOF’s objectives. Each of these programs possesses unique authorities, funding and 
access to partner nations that could greatly benefit U.S. SOF in its effort to expand the 
global SOF network. With this in mind, this section will assess potential partner 
programs within the U.S. government, beginning with an example of an existing 
relationship between Army SF and the DEA. It will then briefly examine three programs 
aimed at curbing nuclear proliferation. Through the analysis of potential partners and 
their respective programs it will then recommend which relationships to pursue in 
combination with the existing Army SF programs mentioned in Chapter III. 
B. AUGMENTATION OF DEA’S EFFORTS 
Just as the DEA partners with local law enforcement agencies to conduct counter-
drug operations in the United States, the DEA also requires partners to conduct its 
international efforts known as counter-narco terrorism (CNT) missions. In accordance 
with Section 1004 of the 1991 National Defense Authorization Act, DOD provides 
support to U.S. government agencies as well as foreign law enforcement agencies in 
counter-drug efforts.118 Although the perception of the success of the overarching War on 
Drugs is controversial, the ability of Army SF to assist in building partner capacity for 
counter-drug purposes is a separate issue. CNT missions are led by the DEA and funded 
through their programs and authorities, but Army SF provides additional capacity to train 
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the host nation participants, creating a mutually beneficial relationship.119 While this 
assists the DEA’s efforts to suppress illegal drug activities overseas, Army SF benefits by 
practicing its skills of working with host nation forces while also expanding its network 
of contacts. As the DEA provides the subject matter experts to train the forces on 
activities peculiar to counter-drug operations, the Army SF elements provide the host 
nation with security training and small-unit tactics. Both organizations leverage their 
capabilities to achieve the overall end state. 
The relationship between the DEA and DOD forces does not always come 
without cost to the overall military mission. Due to the drug trade being an integral part 
of many societies, the U.S. military’s participation in counterdrug efforts can often be 
detrimental to attempts at building rapport within the communities, such as the case of 
operations in Afghanistan.120 With this in mind, it is vital to ensure the willingness of the 
host nation population and government to participate in these efforts, not unlike the 
counterproliferation mission. 
C. THE INTERNATIONAL COUNTERPROLIFERATION PROGRAM 
The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) is the executive agent for the 
International Counterproliferation Program (ICP), providing training and equipment to 
over 10,000 participants in more than 30 nations.121 The program intends to improve host 
nations’ capabilities to “prevent and counter the proliferation of WMD and related items 
across international borders,” with the goal of a standing, professional border security and 
law enforcement capability in the country.122 Although this program initially focused on 
the former Soviet Union (FSU), it has the ability to expand as needed. Seven years after 
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its inception, the FY2005 NDAA gave the DOD authorization to expand ICP globally if 
it decides a threat is worthy of inclusion to the program.123 These flexible authorities can 
be valuable, as they provide the Secretary of Defense the authority to employ the 
program anywhere deemed necessary. 
In order to leverage different capabilities, the ICP is operated in conjunction with 
multiple interagency partners. In testimony to members of Congress, Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction and Negotiations 
Policy Jack David noted that the ICP involved the U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 
the FBI, and other agencies while encouraging multilateral efforts in order to depict the 
proliferation problem as a regional security threat.124 The implications of this multi-
agency, multi-country focus are great. Not only does it attempt to include other elements 
of our U.S. government, but by making this a regional challenge, it encourages greater 
participation by neighboring countries. This not only contributes to the deterrence of 
potential proliferators, but it also allows the participating countries to open dialogue on 
multiple issues, not just those related to WMD. The cooperation by two countries in a 
multilateral event through ICP could be a first step in building a stronger relationship 
between the countries. 
The ICP is a flexible program, taking into account the needs and desires of the 
host nation participants. A study conducted by the RAND Corporation surveyed three 
countries involved in the program and noted vast differences among the program’s 
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Program, the ICP relies less upon large amounts of equipment and focuses instead on 
training of personnel.126 Conveniently, this is an area in which Army SF can provide 
great input and assistance. 
The incorporation of Army SF in the ICP could fill several gaps. As mentioned 
above, the training of partner-nation personnel is a key mission for Army SF; something 
these forces are specifically trained to do. In the RAND study, the assessment team also 
noted the high turnover of officials involved in the program led to a lack of continuity 
and decreased effectiveness.127 An advantage to the inclusion of Army SF is the 
continuity achieved through the enduring relationships cultivated by Army SF, both 
within the ICP and through other engagements. If SOF determines that the ICP is a 
worthwhile program for Army SF’s employment, this could lead to a commitment of its 
forces over a long period of time. While the faces within the Army SF elements may 
change, the continuous presence of U.S. SOF personnel provides a familiarity that breeds 
comfort and consistency. Additionally, since the partner nation forces involved in the ICP 
training are typically border security and law enforcement personnel, the chances are far 
greater that elements of Army SF have already worked with these units through JCETs, 
CNT missions, or other programs unrelated to counterproliferation. Again, this 
familiarity not only encourages “buy-in” from the involved forces, but it further 
strengthens their relationship with the Army SF community. 
Due to the flexible nature of the ICP, to include partner selection, global 
application, and the multilateral focus, this appears to be an ideal partner program for 
Army SF’s consideration. The focus on training of personnel versus purchasing of large 
amounts of equipment and infrastructure plays to Army SF’s strengths. As noted above, 
the possibility of interaction with partner forces that Army SF has already worked with 
through other programs provides additional benefits, allowing us to further develop and 
deepen those relationships. As such, the ICP serves as an example of a potential program 
for Army SF involvement in the counterproliferation effort. 
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D. EXPORT CONTROL AND RELATED BORDER SECURITY 
Whereas the ICP is focused on flexible application of partner-nation training to 
prevent cross-border smuggling, the Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) 
Program’s primary focus is on enhancing “strategic trade control systems” in countries 
that either possess WMD materials or likely transit countries.128 As a State Department 
program, it is aimed at preventing proliferation through education and assistance with 
export control measures, with less emphasis placed on border security. Although the 
program does not focus on training of border security personnel primarily, this is not to 
say that both EXBS and Army SF could not benefit from a partnership. 
Executed by the State Department in over 60 countries worldwide, the EXBS 
receives funding from the annual Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, which allots 
approximately $55 million per year to the program.129 Originally focused on the former 
Soviet Union and surrounding countries, this program has since expanded and includes 
participation from multiple U.S. government agencies involved in security and 
commerce.130 Although these engagements typically focus on export controls, the 
provision of equipment and training provides an opportunity for Army SF engagement. 
While Army SF soldiers are not necessarily experts regarding the employment of 
the technical border surveillance equipment, the border security personnel can benefit 
from Army SF’s training abilities. Leveraging their skills at working with partner nation 
forces, these soldiers can augment the technical trainers and work with the partner nation 
forces to develop tactics, techniques, and procedures for the integration of the technical 
equipment, ensuring it is incorporated as part of the overall border security plan. Much as 
in the ICP, the personnel responsible for securing the borders of our partner nations will 
likely be involved in other programs with U.S. government as well. While contributing to 
the programs, Army SF could serve as the bridge to connect them, providing a familiar 
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face and uniform for the partner nation forces. Additionally, Army SF already works with 
many partner nations’ counter-terrorism and interdiction units through other programs. 
When security personnel need to call upon these interdiction units to assist during 
operations, Army SF’s participation with both elements can lead to increased 
interoperability. 
Occasionally, the ICP and EXBS programs work together with partner nation 
forces in order to provide complementary efforts.131 In such cases, Army SF could again 
provide continuity for the partner nation forces. Rather than simply seeing a myriad of 
U.S. representatives providing seemingly disjointed efforts, the partner nation would 
instead see a familiar entity in the form of Army SF personnel. For this reason, Army SF 
could serve as an integral partner to the EXBS program. 
E. COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM 
The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program, as executed by the 
Department of Defense since 1992, aims primarily to eliminate the threat of WMDs in 
the former Soviet Union by destroying, transporting, or securing the weapons.132 
Although this is a very technically-oriented program, it does include security facets that 
Army SF could assist. In testimony to Congress, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction and Negotiations Policy Jack David 
reported that much of the CTR’s efforts were originally focused on securing Russia’s 
weapons in their existing storage facilities.133 This is a slightly different mission than that 
of the ICP or the EXBS, both of which are focused on preventing the smuggling of WMD 
materials at the borders. While the CTR does include a goal of preventing proliferation 
across borders, the reduction of existing stockpiles receives the most attention. It is, 
however, more limited geographically than the other programs. Without prior approval of 
                                                 
131 Moroney and Hogler, Building Partner Capacity to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, 62. 
132 Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense, Audit Report: Cooperative Threat 
Reduction Program (Arlington, VA: Department of Defense, 2001), 
http://www.dodig.mil/Audit/reports/fy01/01-074.pdf. 
133 Testimony on the Status of the Defense Department's Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, 
109th Cong. 5 (2006) (statement of Jack David), 
http://www.dod.mil/dodgc/olc/testimony_old/109_second.html. 
 45 
the President of the United States, CTR is limited to operations in the FSU. As mentioned 
in Chapter II, however, the CTR has featured prominently in recent efforts to rid Libya 
and Syria of chemical weapons, exhibiting the willingness of our government to expand 
the geographical reach of the CTR, especially as goals are reached in the FSU and the 
program is able to look elsewhere.  
A benefit of the CTR program is that it attacks the problem from a different angle 
than the ICP or EXBS. While the other programs look to interdict proliferation once the 
material is on the move, the CTR looks to the original source of the proliferation. CTR 
does contain an element focused on material in transit, the CTR Proliferation Prevention 
Initiative (PPI), which assists non-Russian FSU states in strengthening their border 
crossing points.134 Mr. David reported to Congress that his office was working with the 
combatant commanders to align COCOM personnel to train host nation partners in the 
PPI-provided equipment, which is an ideal application of Army SF.135  
As with other programs, the ability of the United States to effect change and 
incorporate the CTR in other countries is dependent upon the relationship of our 
governments. Although the relationship with Russia has been strained at times since the 
program’s beginnings, Russia initially accepted the help of the United States, as in was in 
our collective best interest. Other countries may not be as willing to cooperate with the 
United States, which may require us to adopt different strategies. As Rose Gottemoeller 
describes in her chapter in Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle 
East, North Korea would likely be more willing to work with Russia and Kazakhstan 
rather than the United States, just as Iran would be hesitant to coordinate directly with our 
government, creating an opportunity for us to work through a surrogate country versus 
directly with these countries of concern.136 This is another opportunity for Army SF to 
leverage existing relationships in order to reduce threats in a different country altogether, 
following an indirect approach to counterproliferation.  
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Due to the focus on destruction of existing stockpiles and security of nuclear, 
biological, and chemical storage facilities in a very specific geographic location, this 
program has somewhat limited potential for Army SF involvement. Arguably, the Army 
SF members can provide expert trainers on general security operations to the facilities, 
but it would be simply adding capacity to the experts already involved in the program. 
This does not rule out the possibility of Army SF’s augmentation in the CTR, but the 
limited opportunities suggest that it would not likely be a recurring requirement for Army 
SF. While this could assist in building the number of contacts in these countries, it is also 
a very select group of host nation security guards at WMD storage facilities with whom 
other elements of DOD have existing relationships. 
Depending on the security situation in the target country, however, CTR could 
benefit from the established relationships that Army SF maintains. In countries such as 
Syria or Nigeria, where the security situation is less ideal for the presence of lightly 
defended WMD experts yet the CTR could arguably prove beneficial, Army SF can call 
upon its existing relationships or build new ones with the security forces in the country. 
Unlike relatively stable countries such as the former Soviet Union states, implementation 
of CTR in less permissive environments would require a vast security network. It would 
also require knowledge of the country’s transportation and logistics capabilities, which 
Army SF’s network could facilitate. Reliance upon Army SF to provide secure working 
conditions would enable the WMD experts to focus on their primary task of reducing the 
proliferation threat. 
F. CONSIDERATIONS FOR SF INVOLVEMENT 
Each of the above-mentioned programs could benefit from SF augmentation, but 
we must carefully analyze the application of forces each time. Due to the dynamic nature 
of these programs, we cannot employ Army SF in a cookie-cutter fashion. Not only do 
the requirements and desires of the host nation change over time, but so do the 
requirements of the program’s executive agent. At times, the overt presence of U.S. 
special operations forces may not be appropriate in the host nation. We must also 
acknowledge the crawl-walk-run nature of these programs and suggest proper use of our 
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troops accordingly. As each of our potential partner nations’ willingness and capability 
grows, the need for trainers varies as well. Most programs begin at the senior levels, 
involving high-level discussions and engagement at multilateral or bilateral conferences. 
At these initial discussions, SOF representatives should advocate for and determine 
proper use of SF equities. As these conferences transition to host nation personnel on the 
ground receiving equipment and/or training, the employment of Army SF becomes 
optimal. It is important to note the “optimal,” versus the “necessary” employment of 
Army SF during this phase. We must always observe and respect the needs of the host 
nation in order to ensure our participation helps, rather than hinders, the program. 
G. CONCLUSION 
Through the analysis of a small sampling of the various U.S. government-
sponsored counterproliferation programs, we see a viable implementation of Army SF 
into the programs, as well as overlaps between the programs. Overlap and redundancy are 
not always negative aspects, as a gap in coverage would arguably be more detrimental. 
Minimizing this overlap and leveraging the commonalities among the programs, 
however, could be valuable. The example of Army SF and DEA cooperation in the 
counter-drug efforts provides evidence that Army SF has successfully augmented other 
U.S. government agencies in the past with benefits for both the United States as well as 
the partner nations. 
Since many of the above mentioned programs focus on border security, Army SF 
provides a valuable link between not only these programs themselves, but also between 
the border security and military forces with which Army SF currently has relationships. 
Should the need arise for the border security personnel to interact with their own 
country’s interdiction or counter-terrorism elements, the prior training with Army SF 
could ensure better interoperability between the forces. With a common trainer in Army 
SF, we can provide an additional measure to ensure these forces share common tactics for 
interdicting smugglers, as well as ensuring they each understand the other’s capabilities 
and limitations. 
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Since these programs are often conducted outside the purview of DOD elements, 
they are likely not considered for inclusion to the Joint Chiefs of Staff exercises in the 
partner nations. Inclusion of Army SF, as a DOD entity, can expand the possibility for 
participation of these forces and programs into the exercises. An example of this 
possibility is a scenario in which smugglers attempt to cross a border at an unofficial 
border crossing site, thereby testing the border security element’s detection capabilities as 
well as their incorporation of the country’s interdiction assets in order to seize the 
material and personnel. This encourages dialogue among the various elements of a 
partner nation’s security forces and tests the equipment and training provided by the 
programs. 
As this chapter has shown, not all of the aforementioned programs directly suit 
the capabilities of Army SF. Because of this, I am not suggesting that Army SF personnel 
accompany every visit to a partner nation. Many of these program events don’t involve 
border security personnel, but rather high-level government officials and those 
responsible for export control regulations. Rather, I am suggesting that, where 
appropriate, Army SF should be utilized to provide not only continuity between the U.S. 
led programs, but also as a link between elements of the partner nation. This not only 
encourages interoperability for the partner nation, but it takes advantage of Army SF’s 
existing relationships and exposure to these elements through other programs, thereby 
strengthening our relationships with our global SOF network. SOF representation early in 
the engagement process will ensure the proper use and consideration of the capabilities of 
Army SF. 
Once again, the augmentation of these programs by Army SF will not be a 
panacea. Rather, it is an element of the overall counterproliferation and security strategy. 
Our participation in these programs will simply take advantage of different authorities 
and funding and allow us to further our relationships across the world. This will likely 
require a patchwork of programs, to include JCETs, JCS exercises, and other programs 





In this thesis, I aimed to outline a method by which U.S. Army Special Forces 
might contribute to nuclear counterproliferation efforts worldwide. To do so, I first 
showed the problem of nuclear proliferation and how it affects security, and particularly 
how it threatens U.S. interests at home and abroad. Following this, I examined the role of 
Army SF and how its existing programs and missions contribute to the 
counterproliferation effort. Next, I briefly described counterproliferation programs 
conducted by other U.S. government agencies and departments to determine if any 
complemented Army SF’s capabilities and authorities. Each of these sections aimed to 
answer the primary research question: How can U.S. Army Special Forces contribute to 
reducing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction through leveraging the global SOF 
network? While the first manner of solving this problem includes an inward-looking 
solution through the use of existing JCET and other Army SF-specific authorities, the 
second manner is an outward-looking solution, involving Army SF support to other 
agencies and departments. In this conclusion chapter, I will first summarize the findings 
from my research, explaining how Army SF could best contribute to the ongoing efforts. 
Next, I will point out our “way-ahead,” with emphasis on determining where and how to 
employ Army SF for counterproliferation. Finally, I will briefly address areas for future 
research. 
B. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
In Chapter III, I discussed the role of Army SF and the existing programs that are 
best suited to address counterproliferation. I concluded that although we have succeeded 
in adapting our existing authorities to accomplish our missions, these authorities and our 
implementation are not designed for optimal results. The episodic nature of JCETs and 
the focus on training of U.S. personnel, as well as the prohibition of including non-SOF 
U.S. personnel, limit the potential success of CP JCETs. As such, I believe creating 
authorities specifically for CP provides one alternative. While we leverage 1208 and 
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1206 authorities to accomplish our mission in certain circumstances, 1208 authorities 
hinge upon the ties to counter-terrorism concerns. As Chapter II pointed out, part of the 
problem of proliferation includes state actors and non-terrorist threats, thereby limiting 
the use of 1208 authority. As an alternative, a similar authority with funding aimed at 
counterproliferation that does not restrict it to counter-terrorism missions could achieve 
our goal. Although this is by no means the simplest solution, it may provide better long-
term sustainability than continuing to adapt existing authorities and funding. This does 
not come without drawbacks, however. Part of the problem we face in countering the 
WMD threat is the abundance of existing programs and authorities, many of which are 
overlapping and cause unnecessary redundancies. Before creating new authorities and 
dedicating funding, we must first ensure no alternative authorities exist that could suit our 
needs. Only after we have determined a gap should we attempt to create new authorities 
for this purpose. 
Part of this research for existing authorities includes the findings in Chapter IV, 
which examined potential partners and programs. Since so many U.S. government 
agencies and departments conduct counterproliferation programs, this should be our first 
resource for expanding the role and integrating Army SF. Through identifying the 
countries susceptible to proliferation attempts in each theater, we can determine what 
U.S. and other allied efforts are ongoing or in developmental stages. Should we identify a 
potential role for Army SF, we can then approach the proponent of the program and 
determine the feasibility of Army SF’s incorporation. As noted above, not all U.S. 
agencies and not all foreign partners will accept Army SF involvement in their programs. 
Determining which programs best suit our capabilities will narrow our focus and allow us 
to tailor our efforts. 
As suspected at the outset of this research, the optimal use of Army SF may not 
be as simple as choosing the inward- versus outward-looking approach and focusing our 
efforts on this method. Rather, I believe a skillfully crafted plan that incorporates both 
methods best suits our needs. To assume that Army SF has the resident expertise and can 
rely upon its authorities with minimal augmentation by WMD subject matter experts is 
short-sighted. On the other hand, to assume that those programs with the inherent WMD 
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expertise (such as those listed in Chapter IV) cannot use Army SF’s capabilities and 
relationships is also missing the mark. Instead, through incorporating Army SF 
representatives at the initial phases of CP planning efforts with our partner nations as well 
as with other U.S. government entities, we can not only ensure that all our efforts are 
mutually supporting, but we can also fully utilize the global SOF network that we have 
developed through years of cooperation. In some instances, this may require Army SF’s 
support to other programs, such as the EXBS program, in order to provide unique 
capabilities and add capacity to their efforts. Other times, we may be able to minimize the 
focus on WMDs and simply augment JCETs with appropriate subject matter experts, 
thereby achieving a more secure environment. Only through a careful planning process 
will we be able to determine the appropriate level of engagement. As an added benefit, 
this cooperation with other U.S. government entities will increase the likelihood that our 
overall security efforts complement one another, building upon the work of past events. 
This approach is not new, but instead builds on longstanding SOF practices. We 
already leverage multiple authorities and programs in order to build the capacity of our 
partners in other areas. As evidenced by mutually supporting programs to equip and train 
our partners for general mission sets, leveraging 1206, JCET, and foreign military sales 
authorities, this patchwork of efforts can be successful.137 Additionally, SOF and other 
DOD elements often operate under Title 22 Department of State authorities in order to 
conduct security cooperation programs in order to achieve our national security 
objectives.138 Through this thesis, I propose we simply narrow our focus and concentrate 
this same patchwork methodology to a specific threat, namely counterproliferation. 
Although our overall security efforts arguably produce results that affect proliferation 
attempts, narrowing our scope can only serve to further deny potential proliferators. I do 
not argue that this mission is more important than all other missions, but rather, it 
deserves individual attention. 
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C. THE WAY AHEAD 
As mentioned above, the first step in our process is for the GCC staffs to 
determine specific locations of concern for proliferation. Once we have narrowed this 
focus to certain countries and transportation lanes, we can then look at existing programs 
and assess their effectiveness. An educated staff with adaptive, flexible minds can greatly 
affect our potential for success in this realm. Simple awareness of existing programs 
outside of DOD and knowledge of the program’s intent and capabilities could prove 
beneficial. If we understand what others are doing and what they lack, we can then 
determine how DOD and Army SF specifically can assist. We must understand, however, 
that not all partner countries and not all programs will be receptive to Army SF 
involvement. While this does not necessarily rule out Army SF’s participation, it may 
require planners to tailor and scale our participation accordingly. Rather than 
immediately deploying an ODA to a partner country, we may wish to begin our 
involvement at the initial planning phases, attending initial senior-level conferences in 
order to best gauge Army SF’s involvement and serve as a proponent for its inclusion. 
Our initial assessment will also inform us to the level of CP activity in a given country. If 
a country does not have a program tied to it, why not? Is it due to a lack of threat or some 
other reason that could be overcome through leveraging the global SOF network? If a 
country does have CP activity ongoing, is it working optimally? How could Army SF 
assist the program proponents in order to benefit their programs? Are our other efforts in 
the country (unrelated to CP) helping or hindering the programs? Each of these questions 
can help shape our CP efforts in any given country. 
Regardless of the method by which we choose to incorporate Army SF in CP 
activities, we must ensure that the efforts are nested within the GCC’s TCP. If they are 
not, we are simply expending time and resources in an uncoordinated method, achieving 
suboptimal results. Since nothing happens in a vacuum in the security world, we must 
examine our efforts to ensure they complement each other and balance threat versus 
effort. 
Although this seems like it could require a shift in priority for Army SF, in reality 
it could be implemented through the existing practices of the planning staffs. For the 
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Army SF members on the ground, very little will change. They will still deploy to partner 
nations in order to conduct training with host nation forces. Their knowledge of WMD-
specific information is of minimal importance. Instead, rather than training an infantry 
unit in small-unit tactics, for example, they could train border security personnel, with the 
goal of enabling local forces to take the lead in stifling proliferation attempts on their 
own territory. It is incumbent upon the planners to be aware of the various programs and 
authorizations extant throughout the U.S. government and make the contacts on behalf of 
the subordinate elements. This level of situational awareness can be achieved through 
joint assignments, service on joint staffs or in the appropriate intelligence entities, and 
through academic training available through the military education system. 
D. AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
While this thesis offers a potential solution for the CP problem, it is by no means 
all-inclusive. A comprehensive analysis of the CP mission of Army SF requires 
additional time and resources. In order to further develop this model, planners could 
easily focus their efforts on specific programs and countries. Further research could 
identify additional partner programs, and could also determine specific capability gaps 
that could be explored with planners in the respective programs. Insights gained from this 
could lead to discussions on potential Army SF involvement and incorporation into the 
GCC TCPs. As the CP effort will differ greatly between COCOMs, further research will 
determine potential partner countries within the COCOM as well. As mentioned 
previously, each country will provide varying levels of interest in combatting WMD 
efforts. Planners can determine which countries will be receptive to Army SF 
involvement. This is another area in which our global SOF network can provide 
assistance. Programs such as USSOCOM’s Special Operations liaison officer (SOLO) 
and SOF representative (SOFREP) provide USSOCOM and the GCCs input from the 
partner nation’s perspective and their relationship with the host nation personnel will 
provide an excellent starting point to promote CP efforts.139 
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Finally, this thesis has focused solely on U.S. sponsored programs and authorities 
to combat WMD. Obviously, as this is a worldwide threat, our allies will likely have 
existing programs and may express interest in participation with Army SF personnel. 
Awareness of foreign nation equities will help to address possible hesitation by partner 
nation personnel in allowing Army SF participation. If the selected country does not 
express interest in receiving assistance from the United States in particular, we can 
determine which countries they would be willing to work with and approach it from a 
different angle. In the end, our goal is to limit WMD proliferation. Regardless of which 
country or organization claims credit, we all benefit from the effort. 
E. CONCLUSION 
This study provides a template for integrating U.S. counterproliferation objectives 
into Army SF operations. As a broad overview of the issues, it identifies several areas 
deserving of further study prior to implementation. As I have demonstrated, the optimal 
solution will be dependent upon a myriad of factors, to include analysis of existing 
programs, their authorities and constituencies, host nation acceptance of assistance, and 
the specific needs of the host nation. Each situation will be vastly different. While some 
countries may benefit from a low-key approach leveraging JCETs with WMD experts 
augmenting them, other countries may already be involved in a much broader long-term 
approach to combating WMD. For the latter situation, it is necessary for SOF to 
recognize the gaps that Army SF could fill and then understand the best way to approach 
the program proponents and the host nation. Both situations will benefit from a flexible, 
educated planning staff and a dedication by staffs at all levels to incorporate Army SF 
representatives as early in the planning process as possible. While this by no means is a 
guarantee for success, it provides us a great starting point for our efforts against the 
proliferators of the world. 
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